Reputation-based Provider Incentivisation for Provenance Provision by Barakat, Lina et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Barakat, L., Mahmoud, S., Taylor, P., Griffiths, N., & Miles, S. (2016). Reputation-based Provider Incentivisation
for Provenance Provision. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2016).
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Reputation-based Provider Incentivisation for Provenance
Provision
(Extended Abstract)
Lina Barakat
King’s College London
UK, WC2R 2LS
lina.barakat@kcl.ac.uk
Samhar Mahmoud
King’s College London
UK, WC2R 2LS
samhar.mahmoud@kcl.ac.uk
Phillip Taylor
University of Warwick
UK, CV4 7AL
phillip.taylor@warwick.ac.uk
Nathan Griffiths
University of Warwick
UK, CV4 7AL
nathan.griffiths@warwick.ac.uk
Simon Miles
King’s College London
UK, WC2R 2LS
simon.miles@kcl.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Knowledge of circumstances under which past service provi-
sions have occurred enables clients to make more informed
selection decisions regarding their future interaction part-
ners. Service providers, however, may often be reluctant
to release such circumstances due to the cost and effort re-
quired, or to protect their interests. In response, we intro-
duce a reputation-based incentivisation framework, which
motivates providers towards the desired behaviour of re-
porting circumstances via influencing two reputation-related
factors: the weights of past provider interactions, which di-
rectly impact the provider’s reputation estimate, and the
overall confidence in such estimates.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A service-oriented marketplace can be seen as a dynamic
marketplace where individuals interact to achieve their goals.
Besides the outcomes of past interactions, knowledge of the
circumstances under which interactions took place gives in-
dividuals useful (more sufficient) information to support their
decision making in selecting a future interaction partner.
The PROV standard [3] (published by W3C as a standard
for interoperable provenance) provides a suitable solution
for exposing information on various circumstances underly-
ing a service provision. A PROV document describes in a
queryable form the causes and effects within a particular
past process of a system as a directed graph with anno-
tations. The contents of a provenance graph can be col-
lated from data recorded by a set of independent agents,
and clients have a standard means to query the data.
Providers are the obvious source of such provenance data,
as it is a record of how they provided a service, but they
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may not be willing to release such records for several rea-
sons. This may be due to the additional burden incurred
on the provider side (the process of provenance recording
and documentation could be tedious and expensive), or for
competitive grounds (e.g. it may be against provider inter-
ests to release records showing that they performed poorly).
Targeting providers with relevant incentives is a promising
way to encourage them to release provenance data. In the
context of service-oriented marketplaces, reputation is a par-
ticularly attractive (extrinsic) incentive for service providers
since it has a direct effect on their chances of being selected
by clients. Based on this, a reputation-based incentivisation
framework is investigated in this paper.
2. INCENTIVISATION FRAMEWORK
To influence a provider towards provision of (true) cir-
cumstances reports, the incentivisation mechanism in place
(reputation-based in our case) should allow the provider to
gain some utility in response. Existing reputation mecha-
nisms provide a reputation score to compare providers, usu-
ally estimated from ratings given by past customers. An
intuitive approach would thus be to allow the circumstances
given by the provider to influence such a score via influenc-
ing the weight of these ratings. In fact, when circumstances
are available, such an approach seems necessary to ensure
accurate assessments of provide reputation for clients. In
many cases, this also brings benefits to reputation from the
provider perspective. Consider a provider who fails to de-
liver some goods on time on a day when an unexpected trans-
port strike occurs. Such a failure can potentially harm the
provider’s reputation, but is out of the provider’s control.
Thus, it is advantageous for the provider to justify this fail-
ure via revealing the mitigating circumstances that occurred,
to allow for its effect on reputation to be discounted.
Yet, there may be other cases where exposure of circum-
stances would not benefit a provider’s reputation (e.g. the
provider’s performance is not affected by the circumstances).
Moreover, such an approach (i.e. weighting past ratings by
released circumstances) might also motivate providers to-
wards the undesired behaviour of supplying untrue informa-
tion. For example, a provider may claim untrue mitigating
circumstances in order to justify their occasional poor per-
formance and thus avoid reputation losses.
In order to discourage these deception opportunities (i.e.
omitted or misleading information by providers), the cir-
cumstances provision behaviour of a provider should have
an effect on another reputation related factor. We argue
that a plausible factor is the confidence in the weights as-
signed to ratings, influencing in turn the overall confidence
in the reputation score. The intuition behind this is as fol-
lows. When the circumstances underlying a rating are with-
held, the relevence of the rating for the current situation
is uncertain, which should be reflected via a low confidence
in the weight assigned for the rating. Similarly, if the cir-
cumstances report is provided, but is suspicious (suspicious
reports can be detected by confirming them against those
provided by others in the population), the confidence in the
respectively calculated weight for the rating should also be
reduced. The overall confidence in the reputation score for
a provider could have an important impact on the decision
making of the client, and a provider with a low confidence
could potentially be placed lower in the ranking list despite
having a good reputation score.
3. EVALUATION
We conducted an agent-based simulation, which proceeds
in rounds, each involving the following phases: client recon-
sideration; service provision; and provider reconsideration.
In the client reconsideration phase, each client selects an
interaction partner for the current round from the n most
reputable service providers (with an exploration probabil-
ity). To determine the reputation of a provider, the client
utilises FIRE [2] as the base reputation mechanism, aug-
mented with the proposed extension, with the overall rank-
ing score of a provider being a combination of the provider’s
respective reputation and confidence scores. In the service
provision phase, each client receives a service from the se-
lected provider, and rates this service according to their
satisfaction. Here, we consider freak events as potential
circumstances affecting provision of services, as a result of
which providers deliver their services at lower quality levels.
In the provider reconsideration, each provider observes the
profit achieved (in terms of the number of client requests
received) in the current round following its previous circum-
stances provision decision, compares this profit against the
cost incurred (0 if no circumstances report is provided, and
a negative cost otherwise), and adjusts its action policies
accordingly through a form of q-learning [1]. Here, we as-
sume two possible states, occurrence of a freak event, de-
noted by s+, and no occurrence of freak events, denoted
by s−, with three possible provider actions at each state:
reporting correct information (ci), reporting false informa-
tion (fi), and withholding information (wi). The goal is
to push the provider’s behaviour towards action ci, which
corresponds to reporting a freak event occurrence (for state
s+), and reporting no freak event occurrence (for state s−).
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrate the results obtained (av-
eraged over 100 simulation runs, each involving 50 service
providers and 100 clients, with a duration of 2000 rounds).
The proposed incentivisation strategy achieves the desired
provider behaviour, increasing the probability of action ci to
a high level in both states s+ and s−. In particular, in state
s− (Figure 1(a)), withholding information is not a favourable
action since it lowers the confidence in the provider’s rep-
utation estimate, and consequently decreases the provider’s
overall ranking. Action fi is not beneficial in this state,
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Figure 1: Incentivisation with Circumstance-aware
Weighting and Circumstance-aware Confidence
leading to favouring action ci (i.e. reporting freak events ab-
sence), where the boost in confidence achieved via reporting
correct information (verified by comparing this information
with other providers) compensates for the negative utility of
information provision. The same applies for state s+ (Fig-
ure 1(b)). Here, the decrease in confidence from chosing
actions wi or fi further lowers the ranking (and thus the se-
lection chances) of the provider affected by the freak event,
while choosing action ci (i.e. reporting the freak event) pro-
vides a double benefit (discounting the impact of affected
interactions on reputation, and increasing confidence).
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